IN THE CARDIFF COUNTY COURT BS 614159-MC65 CF101741
MAURICE JOHN KIRK
THE CHIEF CONSTABLE OF SOUTH WALES POLICE
CLAIMANTS CLOSING SUBMISSIONS
After three months and ninety nine essential witnesses having given evidence, it is still abundantly clear that significant ‘triggers’ for the Defendant’s course of ‘extreme’ and ‘unusual’ conduct which the Claimant asserts amounts to episodic ‘bullying’ can, in law, amount to ‘misfeasance in a public office’ and that the Claimant had experienced just the same in Guernsey. The Claimant adopts the law as set out in paragraph 30 of The Defendant’s closing submissions with regard to acts of misfeasance.
The Claimant’s sixty four page June 2009 clearly unfinished or tidied up witness statement was signed just in time before the Defendant procured a police helicopter and similarly armed Trojan police team to surround and search the Claimant’s home. It is submitted that these lengths, by their very nature, are indicative of the sort of disproportionate response that results whenever the Defendant’s servants have dealings with The Claimant. Why does the evidence reveal so many disproportionate responses? Why so many ‘hammers’ to crack the ‘Kirk walnut’? What would a reasonably informed observer conclude from the fact that the Claimant is a seasoned veteran of in excess of thirty acquittals? Did these occur simply because ‘Kirk was mad and the police righteous’? Or is there more to this? It is submitted that the sheer number of failed prosecutions alone creates an irresistible inference that the Claimant was systematically targeted and had there been either an evidential sufficiency or public interest basis to these actions the courts would not have acquitted. Systematic arrest and prosecution without evidential sufficiency or public interest criteria prima facie amounts sequentially to false imprisonment, harassment, malicious prosecution and misfeasance in a public office by the servants or agents of The Defendant and, as a consequence, he is vicariously liable. It is over-simplistic of the Defendant to state in paragraph 42 of his Closing Submissions ‘This conspiracy, which he believes existed, was pure fantasy’. A conspiracy is something that can be inferred from facts which are known to be true. The facts that have been established cannot be fantasy. The fact that lightening strikes the same man over and over again cannot be ignored and gives life to the inference. Not one conspiracy but many strikingly similar instances of intolerance to The Claimant indicative of his being systematically regarded as ‘fair game’; ergo: more than one conspiracy.
On one occasion the Claimant was quickly taken away in hand cuffs and incarcerated for nearly eight months, despite the Barry Magistrates’ Court having granted unconditional bail for alleged ‘trading in WW1 machine guns’. This caused the Claimant the damage of his being registered as MAPPA level 3 without him knowing and quickly sectioned under the 1983 Mental Health Act in consequence thereof. But is the Claimant obsessed with his perceived persecution on account of delusion? Paragraphs 38 onward of Defence Submissions invite the court to ridicule the Claimant as a mad conspiracy theorist. Undoubtedly a bad reputation flows from so many court appearances as illustrated by the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeon’s decision to strike off the Claimant after his many distinguished years of practice as a veterinary surgeon for his perceived anti-authoritarian stance. What man’s reputation could withstand being arrested time after time and would not the reasonably informed observer really want to blame the man who is constantly and needlessly put before the courts for railing against Crown Prosecutors, Circuit Judges or Magistrates? What happens when ‘you give a dog a bad name?’ If a man rails off with good reason he is not ‘off the rails’. If one or more police officers decide together to arrest The Claimant based on his ill-gotten celebrity rather than on the merit of each individual action is that not an agreement, which, of necessity, involves misfeasance by those officers? As misfeasance is a crime and conspiracy is an agreement between two or more to commit a crime has not The Claimant, in those circumstances, discharged the civil burden of proof that false arrest, harassment, misfeasance and conspiracy have been demonstrated? Of course, as The Defendant rightly asserts, it would be incredible if all from whom the court received evidence were complicit in ‘One Big Conspiracy’. But cannot events be explained by many minor patterns of repetitive persecution following outward like ripples in a pond responding to a single stone falling into the water which did not go unnoticed?
If repeated misfeasances or agreements to arrest the Claimant happen more than once, without reasonableness, then the law pertaining to harassment is automatically engaged (Paragraphs 29 onwards of The Defendant’s Submissions). If the arrests which were sequential involved no reasonable suspicion of a crime by The Claimant then the law of false arrest is similarly engaged (See the law as correctly set out in The Defendant’s Reply from paragraphs 6 onwards). This action is brought as a response to attempts to have The Claimant further sectioned for good under the Mental Health Act. This led to his being, oh so nearly, incarcerated in Ashworth High Security Psychiatric Hospital for ‘public protection’ at a time when there was a strong likelihood of The Claimant being acquitted.
THE STONE IN THE POND
It was in the 1970s that a high-spirited incident involving a senior police officer’s notebook occurred. In Guernsey the Complainant recollects being repeatedly imprisoned without charge by the police there. As The Claimant’s antecedents would have been available to the Defendant’s servants or agents here in Wales it is right to infer South Wales Police would have had, as part of their duty, to appraise themselves of The Claimant’s notebook incident and ‘the notes taken at the time’. A pattern of events in which the Claimant had been acquitted in the Somerset area was capable of persuading the majority of informed police officers here in Wales that the Claimant was no ordinary man and possibly ‘anti-police’. It is conceivable Newton’s third law was engaged in this way: Every Action has an Equal and Opposite Reaction. The reaction of South Wales Police to Maurice Kirk living on their patch was adverse.
When the Claimant moved to the Barry area it was only a matter of good police practice that local officers would have had to research him. He was a larger than life veterinary surgeon, a flying vet. He had flown under a bridge in London etc. etc. More paradoxically, Maurice Kirk was the police veterinary surgeon. Too many Officers have said on oath in these proceedings that The Claimant was even a good veterinary surgeon. See paragraph 44 of the Defence Submissions:
‘they regarded the Claimant as an extremely competent and skilled veterinary surgeon, but equally that they regarded the claimant as an eccentric, awkward, belligerent, evasive and difficult man to deal with.’
The point is that it is inconceivable that any one officer would have been justified in arresting The Claimant under ‘The General Arrest’ provisions of The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 namely that The Claimant’s identity was unknown or that he had no identifiable address for service of summons. Yet we see those grounds being relied on by The Defendant in this case. The Claimant recollects being stopped thirty five times to produce his motor insurance alone. The Claimant accepts the paragraph 44 observations may well be fair. We all have our issues and the Guernsey issue may well have lit a fire within the Claimant. The question for the court is did The Defendant, through his servants and/or agents, deliberately throw gasoline on that fire in the knowledge The Claimant could always be relied upon to respond?
THE VARIOUS CLAIMS AND THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT
As pleaded in paragraph 4 of the amended Particulars of Claim the Claimant was known to the Defendant’s officers at Barry police station. They were aware The Claimant had a current and full driving licence. On the 2nd January 1993 PC Phillips (as he then was) was on duty when he observed a motor car with defective front and rear lights. He required the Claimant to produce his driving documents. The Claimant ended up being prosecuted for no insurance. Paragraph 52 is relevant as The Defendant concedes ‘the Police…became aware…that the Claimant possibly held valid insurance…’
The Claimant was subsequently disqualified for 6 months. The Claimant appealed (paragraph 53) but the fact that his disqualification had been suspended was not communicated by the collator to the relevant authorities (paragraph 54). The Claimant does not accept this was an error. In the event the Claimant’s conviction was overturned (paragraph 56). The question of reasonable and probable cause becomes a cumulative issue as this was to be the established pattern.
With the deepest of respect, the suggestion the Claimant brought these unhappy events upon himself is whimsical.
In March 1993 the Claimant was stopped outside his own hospital for being in charge of a vehicle with insufficient tread on a tyre. The Claimant avers no examination of his tyre ever took place by PC Lott. His conviction was set aside upon appeal to the Crown Court. However self-serving the wording of Paragraph 64 of the Defence Submissions it is impossible to steal the thunder of Particulars of Claim 8.5 (e): that the fact the self-carbonating HORT/1 top copy handed to The Claimant did not accord with the officer’s second copy proved the lie to the ‘notes taken at the time’ purpose of the HORT1 booklet and there had been a fabrication. The Defence submit (there) ‘is of itself (nothing) wrong with this course of conduct’. That is an astonishing statement as it sits very uncomfortably and consistently with what could be perceived as doing an act tending to and intending to pervert the course of public justice.
In May 1993 the Claimant was arrested in Grand Avenue, Ely, Cardiff. The Claimant was riding a motorcycle he had purchased in Guernsey from a police officer. On examination of the panniers articles were found consistent with the tools of a veterinary surgeon. In paragraph 80 of the Defence Reply the phrase appears
‘there came a time when the officer believed that given his suspicions and in order to allow summonses to be issued, and to further his enquiries about the vehicle, he needed to arrest the Claimant, so as to allow his identity, including name and address, to be established.’
‘although he had a residual suspicion (residual means remaining after the greater part is gone so is that a euphemism for no suspicion?) that the motorcycle might be stolen that suspicion had been lessened as the incident developed….
That is an extraordinary statement. It invites the court to the conclusion that before Mr. Kirk had to be arrested there was no suspicion that the motorcycle was stolen.
At Paragraph 80 the officer relies on section 25 of The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.
Another extraordinary statement appears:
‘ I was considering the vehicle excise offence and it was pointed out to me in management action afterwards by my sergeant that it was not appropriate to deal with that under s 25, so I received some action after that.’
In other words the officer was admonished for being heavy-handed. The Claimant was remanded in custody for three days, his motorcycle damaged and charges, including his having an offensive weapon namely a garrotte were subsequently withdrawn.
The garrotte was with syringes. The educated accent of the Claimant and the surrounding circumstances were all clues that the suspect was a vet. The police admitted on oath that they had telephoned Guernsey and obtained details of The Claimant’s purchase of the motorcycle. So the Guernsey enquiry, the tools he had with him being tools of a vet all would have inevitably led the officers to the conclusion: Here was Maurice Kirk. Yet the Claimant was incarcerated. The three pleaded actions thus far being just months apart of each other. This is prima facie evidence of false arrest, harassment and malicious prosecution. The Claimant’s evidence was that the police officer brought over from Barry knew him by sight, in any event. That was a highly likely proposition given the Claimant’s larger than life persona.
Paragraph 85 confirms the proximity of the Claimant’s surgery and the fact that something compelled the officer to make enquiries within. As the police state this information could not have been information from the Claimant himself one is left with the inescapable conclusion that the cause of the enquiry was the protestations of the onlookers whom the Claimant recollects were shouting, ‘That’s our vet!’ or words similar.
The Claimant has been advised that there is an appearance of a serious criminal indictment due in this case accentuated by not just by the extreme lengths to which the Defendant has gone to withhold evidence but what has been heard in court alongside those statements previously prepared and distributed for each defence witness made to sign.
A following forty odd pages will shortly follow delayed only because of this weekend’s yet one more example of the ‘inequality in arms’ between the parties.
Maurice J Kirk BVSc 15th July 2013
See full submission: